The Day The Congress Lost
And it wasn’t after Balakot
Since the election results were announced on 23rd of May, the Congress (and most of the opposition) has gone in some kind of a convolutional fit. India’s Grand Old Party- the Indian National Congress, is facing a crisis of unspeakable proportions. So much so that for the first time, there is a leadership vacuum due to reluctance than competition and infighting. The ridiculous fashion in which senior leaders and the CWC has conducted itself will (if not has already) turn out to be virulent for the party. Recently, deciding to not send its spokespersons to TV debates, because let’s face it nobody knows what Congress is up to!
As much as everyone would like to blame the dismal electoral performance on the Modi wave, or the sudden Hindu nationalist narrative unleashed, or media propaganda, or the aggressive national security policies and decisions, truth is, the election was never the Congress’, neither did it ever belong to the opportunistically stitched together Federal Front of Mahagathbandan. The failure of the Congress is the result of a series of blunders and miscalculations it has undertaken since 2014. Each one contributing its bit to the ultimate disaster that unfolded on 23rd.
To begin with, the NYAY debacle. NYAY as an election promise or policy for the matter was destined to fail. Once again Congress showed that the top echelons and their attitudes haven’t changed much, and as a whole, it doesn’t understand modern Indian voter’s psyche. In two well-researched article by Swaminathan S. Aiyer of the famous Swaminomics fame, Mr. Aiyer pointed out in Dec’16http://swaminomics.org/dont-eulogise-amma-for-her-freebie-politics/and again on March’19( https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/Swaminomics/another-rs-2000-per-farmer-wont-swing-the-election/ that time when freebies and handouts won elections have gone. A vivid example of this is the fact that firstly, every state government that has managed to deliver rapid GDP growth has returned (irrespective of freebies offered), and the fact that despite the much publicised NREGA launched under UPA-I, the Congress performed poorly and won just 22/115 seats in the poor rural regions some which were the biggest beneficiaries of NREGA. Not to mention the complete wipeout five years later in 2014. In another well-articulated video put forward by the Quint, its founder argues that Congress’ 2009 victory was due to the economic growth, and strong leadership shown by Dr Singh, especially during the Nuclear Deal fiasco. Albeit Congress went back again to the same old ‘Gareebi Hathao’. One remarkable bit of insight into Mr Modi’s earlier victory in 2014 actually came from- of all places, John Oliver’s ‘The Last Week Tonight’. Where Fareed Zakaria of the CNN said that 2014, was the first time an Indian General Election was won by promise of strong economic growth, rather than subsidies and freebies. All of this indicates two things- a paradigm shift away from the socialistic cries of ‘Gareebi Hathao’, and a sense of self-respect amongst the voters who no longer are swayed by mere handouts.
The second blunder was forgetting the fact that the Congress is a national party. While evoking subnational and regional sentiments is often necessary during state polls, during national polls, the same people vote- keeping in mind the broader national picture, and the best representatives of states’ issues at the Union level. This cross voting is well illustrated even recently in states like Odisha and Telangana where assembly and Lok Sabha poll results showed opposite trends. Congress decided to make the general election, 543 wars instead of one battle. In states like Karnataka where it joined hands with arch-rivals JDS, resulting in disillusion amongst the cadres and erosion of vote bank, it lost heavily. Same was the cases elsewhere, where the Congress often found itself supporting parties with diametrically opposite vote banks. In states where it aligned well like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, it won. Everywhere else it lost.
The third was deciding to lend a voice every small skirmish against Mr Modi and the BJP. This resulted in an image of the party lacking self-confidence and the ability to weave a narrative. Anyone waging any kind of a battle against the BJP found support from the Congress. Whether JNU, or the TMC in Bengal, TDP in Andhra or KCR in Telangana, the Congress couldn’t be happier to help. Little did it realise that often this resulted in their own local cadres losing voice and them losing opportunities. For example, in 2016, Congress came out as the second largest party in Bengal. This was despite it fighting a lesser number of seats than its partner CPM. However as it is always the case, Congress couldn’t wait to lose another opportunity. Instead of capitalising on this gain, the central leadership stood beside Ms Mamata Banerjee during every brigade and senior leaders fought the same cases for Mamata & TMC in courts, which the state unit found itself on the other side. While their own cadres were killed and harassed, the Congress lent a voice in support of TMC on almost every issue. Furthermore wasting resources and energy on controversies like run-ins against the Judiciary proved to be counterproductive.
Last but not least, as mentioned in an earlier post, the Congress failed to understand a worldwide anti-establishment undercurrent. It stuck to the same old guard, and old ways which people had grown weary and distrustful of. Instead of rewarding fresh hardworking faces such as Jyotiraditya Scindia and Sachin Pilot, the fresh blood had to hand the victory on a platter to the same old ‘established faces’. Moreover, the Congress went ahead with the blunder of attacking the Prime Minister’s personal character and intentions on issues like Rafale, DeMo, which even to his opponents and detractors remains intact, created an antagonistic image for India’s GOP.
